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The natural rights of children
I. Introduction
There are four sections in this paper. In section II we offer, and 
analyze, Rothbard’s libertarian theory of children. Section III 
is our attempt to apply preference-based child rights theory. 
The burden of section IV is to offer a brief history of children’s 
rights. In section V, we mention and then respond to a series of 
objections that were articulated by the referee of this journal. 
Section VI concludes.
II. Rothbard
We analyze the natural rights of children from a libertarian 
perspective (1,2). This philosophy is predicated upon two basic 
premises the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP), that no one 
may initiative force or the threat thereof against an innocent 
person and private property rights based on homesteading. 
The latter holds that he who first makes use of a resource 
enjoys the exclusive right to its use. Only through voluntary 
transfer can the right to use/exploit a resource be legitimately 
obtained. However, private property rights and the implication 
of the NAP are not so cut and dried when it comes to children. 
Here, some degree of aggression is unavoidable. And not only 
unavoidable, but also justified. Young children are unable to 
care for themselves. Caretakers must necessarily exercise a 
certain amount of “aggression” for the child’s benefit: carrying, 
feeding, and nurturing the child without his consent. Under 
current law, when the child reaches the age of eighteen, the 
caregiver’s authority terminates1.
Rothbard writes, “The right of self-ownership by each man has 
been established for adults, for natural self-owners who must 
use their minds to select and pursue their ends” (3).
Children are a challenge for all political philosophies, and 
1. Different jurisdictions proscribe different ages, typically ranging from 14 to 21, 
depending upon the issue involved.
libertarianism constitutes no exception. The problem is that 
cognitive development occurs gradually (4). At each stage, 
the child acquires greater understanding of the world, but 
these steps usually occur at different rates; and some children 
may never fully develop their cognitive abilities. Not only 
do children develop cognitively at different rates, there are 
qualitative differences in their modes of cognitive development. 
Unfortunately, in today’s world of clinically zealous 
psychiatrists, in tandem with the judicial system’s readiness 
to acquiesce in questionable diagnoses, resulting standards 
could provide justification for nanny state like policies, and 
even various kinds of child abuse2. Mental disorders could 
be excessively invoked as grounds for curing/eliminating the 
rights of adults. Delayed cognitive development could provide 
zealous enforcers (psychiatrists, courts) with the justification to 
infringe illegitimately on a person’s right to monitor/determine 
his own conduct, even for adults3.
2. There are some libertarians (5,6) who make the argument that spanking is 
incompatible with the libertarian NAP. What do libertarians of this sort offer, instead, 
for child rearing? First and foremost, reasoning with the child. But, suppose he is 
too young, or too excited, for any such tactic to be fruitful? Then, second, there 
is the “time out”: the child is confined to his room until he learns his lesson, and 
or has calmed down and has become amenable to reason. The difficulty here is 
that imposing a time out on a youngster, strictly speaking, is also a violation of 
the NAP. If one adult were to compel another to take a break along these lines 
he would be seen, clearly, to have engaged in kidnapping. That is exactly what a 
time out constitutes. Forcing someone against his will to calm down, or stand in 
the proverbial corner, or be confined to his bedroom is considered an assault (a 
threat); backing it up with physical violence would constitute a felony. Libertarian 
critics of spanking cannot be allowed to have it both ways, to have their cake and 
eat it too. If they want to treat children as full rights bearing persons, such that it 
would be a libertarian crime to violate the NAP against them, then they must adopt 
the same policies toward them as they would properly do for other adults: the 
threat or the initiation of violence would be strictly prohibited. No time outs either. 
3. There is no one who has done more to combat this type of legislative and 
judicial over-reach than Thomas Ssasz. See on this (7,8)
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Furthermore, recent advancements in developmental psychology 
have challenged the dominant view that infants/small children 
are mindless creatures. Indeed, as recently as a generation ago, 
most (many) psychologists, philosophers and psychiatrists were 
of the opinion that infants and young children were irrational, 
egocentric and amoral beings, unable to understand the 
workings of cause and effect, to empathize with the experiences 
of others or to appreciate the distinction between reality and 
fantasy. Many people continue to hold this view (4)4.
Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman propose that infants have the 
ability to understand principles of physics and relations of cause 
and effect (9). Children may be less egocentric and better able to 
understand the world than many commentators previously gave 
them credit for. Gopnik and Repacholi contend that by the age of 
eighteen months, infants have acquired the ability to determine 
others’ preferences based on facial expressions (4,10). Recent 
advancements in child psychology suggest that youngsters are 
indeed able “to select and pursue their ends”, thus making them 
homesteaders of their own bodies, legal adults, by the standard 
Rothbard (1998) sets out (3).
Rothbard’s contributions to libertarian philosophy preceded 
much current research into early cognitive development. The 
time has come to update Rothbard’s theory in light of this 
research.
Focusing on the caretaker, Rothbard writes that his right to 
make decisions on behalf of the child is not absolute: 
“But surely the mother or parents may not receive the ownership 
of the child in absolute fee simple, because that would imply the 
bizarre state of affairs that a fifty-year old adult would be subject 
to the absolute and unquestioned jurisdiction of his seventy-
year-old parent. So the parental property right must be limited 
in time. But it also must be limited in kind, for it surely would 
be grotesque for a libertarian who believes in the right of self-
ownership to advocate the right of a parent to murder or torture 
his or her children” (3).
It follows that parental ownership is not an absolute, but is of 
the nature of a guardianship relationship. In short, every baby 
from the moment of birth, possesses the right of self-ownership 
by virtue of his potential to become an adult. It would therefore 
be a violation of the child’s rights if a parent or caretaker were 
to mutilate, torture, murder or subject a child to physical or 
emotional violence (3).
The relationship between the parent and child is not the only 
example of trustee rights in libertarian philosophy. The theory 
applies as well to those who may be unable to communicate their 
preferences (11). It is not disability that creates dependency. An 
individual may be temporarily disabled by, for example, falling 
under the influence of alcohol, opiates, marijuana, and other 
such substances that significantly reduce cognitive functioning 
yet hardly require legal supervision. A social drinker or 
recreational drug user may be so intoxicated that he may 
require the assistance of a caretaker, but so long as he is able to 
express his preferences, the appointment of a caretaker would 
violate his rights. The criterion upon which to base the need for 
a caretaker should not be mental disability, but an inability to 
express one’s preferences.
Rothbard asserts that a child has attained the right to be self-
governing (adult status) once he “leaves or ‘runs away’ from 
4. Gopnik, a professor of psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, 
specializes in cognitive and language development.
home5” (3). If we invoke the child’s ability to express his 
preferences as a guide to the attainment of the full panoply of 
adult rights, disability, in itself, would be insufficient grounds 
to deny them.
Strictly speaking, an individual becomes self-governing at the 
moment of birth. When the infant reaches the toddler stage 
and begins to acquire facility with language, he becomes able 
verbally to express his preferences. At that point, a caretaker’s 
rule may relax and continues to diminish as the child  grows 
until, at age eighteen, legal emancipation begins and is rendered 
complete at age twenty-one. However, many individuals are 
qualified for partial or even complete emancipation prior to age 
eighteen let alone age twenty-one. 
Full emancipation implies that a parent or guardian would lose 
all legal control of his child. However, in the free society, there 
would also be such a thing as partial emancipation. Here, the 
legal relationship takes on the nature of an implicit contract. The 
caretaker provides such essentials as food, education, healthcare 
and housing. In return, the child follows the caretaker’s rules. 
The relationship between caretaker and child, in this respect, is 
akin to the relation between a diner and a restaurant at which 
the diner pays for his meal. If the child refuses to abide by the 
conditions dictated by his caregiver he has, as Rothbard states, 
“[r]egardless of his age,... the absolute right to run away and to 
find new foster parents who will voluntarily adopt him, or to try 
to exist on his own” (3).
But this statement has to be interpreted sympathetically. 
Otherwise we arrive at the specter of a two year old throwing a 
tantrum and wanting to run away from home in a fit of pique, 
right then and there. Surely this cannot be the libertarian 
position. However, if we interpret Rothbard as saying that 
this can indeed be done, but not right then and there, not at 
a moment’s notice, not without a by-your-leave from anyone 
apart from a baby in his “terrible twos”, then the viewpoint 
makes more sense. This is not the beginning of the process, 
but rather the end of it: a court must pronounce judgment that 
this is indeed in the best interests of the tiny tot. Time must be 
used for sober analysis of the situation. Experts (social workers, 
psychologists) must be brought in to verify the facts of the case. 
Then and only then may this “absolute right to run away and to 
find new foster parents” be fully implemented. A two year old 
cannot just be allowed to wander off to be on his own because 
he resents the fact that he is not allowed to eat all the ice cream 
he wants—because his parents fear he will get a stomach ache. 
If these “runaway” rights of children are to be implemented in a 
reasonable way, judicial support must be acquired.
III. Applying preference-based child rights
We now have the means to examine more pointedly the 
ethical dilemmas involved in determining6 the respective 
rights of children and their caretakers. Consider the case of 
Rebecca Chittum and Callie Conley, switched at birth (12) at 
the University of Virginia Medical Center in 1995 (13). Some 
5. In the spirit of Rothbardian terminology, we can say this occurs “when the child 
has homesteaded himself”.
6. In a previous iteration of this paper, we wrote “balancing” instead of the word 
that now appears in the text, “determining”. This change was purposeful and 
substantive. Libertarians do not “balance” rights. People either have rights, or they 
do not, and it is the function of the libertarian analyst to shed light on which is 
which. If there is a seeming conflict in rights, one or the other or both have been 
mis-specified.
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four years later, Paula Johnson, Callie’s presumptive mother, 
discovered that the child she raised as her daughter, Callie, was 
born as Rebecca Chittum. Shortly thereafter, Rebecca’s parents 
were killed in a car crash. Rebecca’s grandparents became Callie’s 
caregivers. Callie’s biological mother unsuccessfully sued for 
custody while seeking to maintain custody of Rebecca (13). Let 
us reiterate, since it is important to be able to see precisely who 
is who in this case: Callie’s biological mother, Paula Johnson, 
sued for custody of Callie who was being cared for by Rebecca’s 
adoptive grandparents after Rebecca’s adoptive parents were 
killed in a car crash. And Paula Johnson sought to keep custody 
of her adoptive daughter, Rebecca. Had Johnson prevailed in 
court, she would have been the mother of both babies.
The Rothbardian theory of children’s rights helps us determine 
the just outcome though the result may seem curious. Rothbard 
poses two scenarios. The biological mother’s right may prevail 
because she gave birth to the child. Or the presumptive parents’ 
right may prevail because they initially raised the child. 
Initially, the parents play the role of the child’s trustee. The fact 
of biological parenthood defeats any claim to the contrary7. In 
that event, Callie’s biological mother would be awarded custody. 
Callie, who had thus far lived as Rebecca, the presumptive 
granddaughter of her current caregivers, would be forced to 
live with a stranger. A preference-based approach, in sharp 
contrast, looks to the child. Assuming she is capable of stating 
her preference, she would choose her guardian and may even, 
were she capable of doing so, choose to live on her own.
Let us put this matter in other words. If the child is too young 
to choose, then the biological parents get the private property 
rights nod vis a vis the “mere” caregivers. Why? For two 
reasons: First, a genetic relationship is a more direct version of 
“homesteading” than is bringing up the baby. The mother and 
father have a greater connection to their offspring than someone 
who, due to this accident, brought up their child. Second, the 
fact of birth preceded, in time, what came later. Other things 
being equal, which they are not in this case, that alone would 
move us strongly in the direction of awarding the child to her 
natural parents. Given the first point, genetic connection, these 
two considerations together align justice on the side of biology. 
Let us consider the concept of adverse possession here. This is 
the rule under which if A occupies B’s property, treating it as his 
own, and B does not object, after a sufficient length of time the 
property belongs to A. One can think of it as abandoned property 
again available to be homesteaded. This works reasonably well, 
perhaps, with a coat accidentally switched at a large party, or 
with a piece of land. It would appear to function less adequately 
with regard to children, if for no other reason than that they 
bear the genetic codes of their biological, not adoptive, parents.
At what age is the child old enough to choose? There is no 
right answer to this question. Libertarian theory alone cannot 
vouchsafe us a clear response. There is a continuum problem 
here, one that no political philosophy, including libertarianism, 
can unambiguously answer8.  Whatever age is arbitrarily chosen, 
7. That is, parents have a better claim to the child than any outsiders, because of 
their natural link to the child (14).
8. Given that statutory rape laws are justified, a position we now assume arguendo, 
what is the correct age at which they kick in? Clearly, going to bed with a five year 
old girl falls within the law, no matter how “willing” is the child. It is clear she has 
not yet reached, nor even come close, to the age of consent. And, of course, 
there will be youngsters below that age who are more mature 
than their contemporaries above that age. The only definitive 
answer emanating from this quarter is that the courts should 
decide this issue9.
IV. A brief history of children’s rights
The degree of freedom implied by libertarian theory, such as 
children’s freedom to choose their guardians or, in the alternative, 
emancipation, differs markedly from the contemporary view of 
children’s rights. But it comports with an older, widely held view 
of this issue. Other cultures and polities, ancient and modern, 
have granted children freedoms not permissible even for adults 
in much of Europe and the United States. The view that children 
require constant monitoring on the part of parents, guardians 
and the state, particularly governmental schools, is a relatively 
recent phenomenon (21). 
In the Middle Ages, children, when no longer toddlers, were 
taken to be miniature adults. They routinely participated in adult 
activities (22). This attitude continued into the Renaissance, 
along with the widespread voluntary transfer of caregiver rights 
from unfit mothers to churches but also, unfortunately, the lack 
of economic wealth drove many mothers who could not afford 
their babies to commit infanticide (23).
During the European Renaissance, the practice arose of 
transferring to the Church and to lay caregivers children whose 
parents were thought to be unfit, and this alleged unfitness was 
frequently the consequence of an impoverishment that spurred 
the practice of infanticide. The onset of the Enlightenment, 
in line with developing theories of pedagogy further eroded 
this older concept of children as autonomous beings (which 
was the view of the medieval church). Yet, in contrast to this 
Enlightenment view, the prevailing attitude regarding children 
in pre-industrial America, was more akin to an older, medieval 
concept of children, and this was because of the economic 
conditions of most Americans, at that time, conditions that 
required, among other things, child labor. 
The view of children as free individuals began to change during 
the Enlightenment when adults began philosophizing about 
the differences between adulthood and childhood in line with 
developing theories of pedagogy. Children continued to hold 
onto their freedom into the industrial revolution, but such 
freedom was not the result of a more just society. It was an 
unavoidable consequence of the pre-developed America with 
little wealth that children had to act grown up by working and 
living like adults.
In contrast to prevailing American attitudes toward children, 
the Wintu people of Northern California more thoroughly 
honor the freedom/rights of children. For example, in English, 
if you “take a baby” somewhere, there is an implicit sense of 
coercion. The Wintu language puts if differently: “I went with 
the baby”. “I watched the child” would be, “I watched with the 
having intercourse with a willing 25 year old woman cannot be considered rape. 
But what about 15? 16? 14? There is no clear right answer. This is a matter for the 
courts to determine. For more on the continuum problem, see (15). It might well be 
objected that “this is a matter for the courts to determine” is not really an answer. 
On what basis are the courts to decide? Our response to this objection is that 
this is precisely why all civilized peoples have courts in the first place. Not every 
issue, most of them but not every one of them, can be resolved by resort to basic 
premises such as the NAP of libertarianism.
9. For the argument that these should be private, not governmental courts, see 
(3,16–20)
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child”. The Wintu lack the word for coercion and even the 
concept of it. This, of course, does not mean they cannot engage 
in such acts, but, it makes it less likely. Of course, observation of 
actual practice would be far more relevant than mere linguistic 
analysis.
When a Wintu child asks,  “May I…?” he is not asking for 
permission so much as for clarification about whether or not the 
proposed action comports with community norms. In that way, 
the child feels less at the mercy of a lone adult whose standards 
may seem capricious and arbitrary (24). Griffiths tells of tribes 
in which “five-year-olds wield[ing] machetes with deftness and 
precision”, and in one instance, of an eight-year-old Igloolik10 
child who carved the body of a caribou without mishap and 
of children in West Papua who set their own daily schedules, 
eating, sleeping, and playing as the spirit moves them11.
V. Objections12
1. Above, we say the following: “But surely the mother or 
parents may not receive the ownership of the child in absolute 
fee simple, because that would imply the bizarre state of affairs 
that a fifty-year old adult would be subject to the absolute and 
unquestioned jurisdiction of his seventy-year-old parent”. The 
objection here is that this was in fact the legal situation under 
Roman law. Our only response, then, is that this system was truly 
bizarre. Parents would be able to literally enslave their children 
without the consent of the latter. This flies in the face of pretty 
much anything that most people hold sacred and properly so13.
2. Here is another challenge, which also starts off with a quote 
from what appears above:
“A court must pronounce judgment that this is indeed in the 
best interests of the tiny tot. Time must be used for sober 
analysis of the situation. Experts (social-workers, psychologists) 
must be brought in to verify the facts of the case. Then and only 
then may this ‘absolute right to run away and to find new foster 
parents’ be fully implemented”.
The objection is that we are contradicting ourselves. On the one 
hand, we point out that a “time out” also requires the use of 
violence, not only spanking. But it is more than unusual to allow 
some people to coerce others until an authority rules that this 
is unjustified.
In responding to the “no spanking, but a time out is all right” 
argument, we pointed out its inconsistency in implying that 
parents cannot spank their children also implies that they 
cannot imprison them. A similar problem seems to arise here. 
We do not normally argue that individuals can coerce others 
until some authority rules that the coercion is not in the best 
interests of the victim. Justifying that claim requires something 
more than bare assertion”.
Correct, this is not normally argued. But children are different 
than adults. They are not (yet) full rights bearing entities. If we 
leave an adult to his own devices, he is presumably able to run 
his own life, at least to his own satisfaction. But if a child is not 
cared for, for example, a three-year old, he must perish, since 
he cannot (yet) care for himself. Paternalism is not justified for 
adults, but it is for such youngsters. Libertarian theory is often 
at odds with mainstream legal philosophy but not so much, if 
10. Igloolik is an Inuit Hamlet in Northern Canada.
11. The determination of whether or not these claims are actually true is beyond 
the expertise of the present authors.
12. We thank a referee of this journal for articulating these objections. 
13. But is it not true that the child consists, literally, of nothing he may properly call 
his own? His body is based, solely, on an egg, a sperm, neither of which belong to 
him but rather to his parents, plus nutrients, also given to him by them. He consists 
of nothing else but that which belongs to his parents. For an intriguing rejection of 
this plausible-seeming but actually preposterous claim, see (14). 
at all, with regard to acknowledging the fact that children are 
helpless, and incorporating this into the law.
Suppose an adult, call him A, is seen doing or refraining from 
doing something mildly injurious to his health. He eats food off 
the floor; he fails to brush his teeth; he eats unhealthily; he gets 
drunk (but does not drive a car); he does not clean his room, etc. 
Were another adult, call him B, to compel A to engage in better 
behavior in any of these regards, clearly, A’s right will have been 
compromised by B. But now posit that A is a child of three years 
of age. His parents forbid/compel him to behave more properly 
in the same manner. It is our contention that the words “coerce” 
and “coercion” do apply to A the adult, but not at all to A the 
child, given that their behavior is identical. Now consider a 
second case where the parents beat the child to within an inch of 
his life. “Coerce” and “coercion” certainly now apply in this clear 
case of child abuse. But here it is no longer true that “individuals 
can coerce others until some authority rules that the coercion is 
not in the best interests of the victim”. Rather, the child may be 
removed immediately from these criminal parents.
3. The next objection is as follows: This hard line libertarian 
position totally ignores parental obligations. Are the parents 
legally free to preside over the death of their child? Are they 
obliged to find an alternative caregiver if they no longer wish to 
be guardians?  And what about costs, if the parents do not wish 
to raise it14.
Here is our answer to these challenges, according to what we see 
as libertarian theory15. But first some necessary background. No 
adult may properly own another without the latter’s consent16. 
Human beings commit no wrong when they render into private 
property animate resources (cows) or inanimate ones (land, 
trees). Children occupy a middle ground between these two 
extremes. Parents may not own their progeny, but they are licitly 
in receipt of the guardianship rights over them, due to the fact 
that they have homesteaded them. They make keep these rights 
provided they live up to the requirements of guardianship: to 
guard the child against harm, to care for and feed him, educate 
him, etc. As there are no positive obligations, there is no 
requirement that the parent continue in this homesteading role. 
He may, instead, give the child up for adoption or sell it, or bring 
the unwanted baby to the traditional places: hospital, religious 
organization or orphanage. But is this latter requirement not a 
violation of the no positive obligations rule? Not at all. For if a 
parent who no longer wishes to care for a child simply allows 
him to starve to death without notifying anyone that he wishes to 
rid himself of this relationship, he commits the rights violation 
of illicit precluding or forestalling17. What is that? Consider a 
patch of land shaped like a donut with a hole in the middle of it. 
A is the hole, B is the donut, C is the area outside of the donut.  Is 
the homesteader allowed by libertarian theory to mix his labor 
with area B, and not allow anyone from area C access to area 
A? No. Because then he would have obtained effective control 
over area A18 without having touched it. He would, in effect, 
own it in the sense that he could preclude all other from access, 
and then homestead it at his leisure. The parent who starves a 
baby without notifying anyone of this breach of guardianship 
is akin to the person who homesteads B’s land. Only here, the 
baby takes on the role of A. Such a parent is violating the rights 
of the baby and of all others who might wish to care for him by 
precluding access of the latter to the former.
14. Bill Bradford, Editor of Liberty Magazine, raised these issues in his polls of 
libertarian beliefs in the magazine; see on this (25–28).
15. For a further elaboration, see (3,29–31).
16. For a defense of voluntary slavery, the discussion of which would take us too 
far away from the topic of this paper, see (32–34).
17. For a further elaboration of this concept, see (11,35–37)
18. He can prevent others from entry.
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With this background, let us now respond to the challenges to 
the theory posed above.
Do the parents have any obligation to support the child? No. 
Are they free to dump him out? Yes, to the orphanage, hospital, 
religious organization that takes on babies or to an adoptive 
parent. May the initial parent starve or freeze the baby to 
death? Certainly not. Are the parents obliged to try to find an 
alternative caregiver first? Yes, indeed. However, if there is not 
a single solitary adult on the planet who wishes to take on this 
role, then and only then may the baby be put to death. Can the 
parents, for instance, put the child behind a window and charge 
viewers to watch it starve to death? No; that is grotesque. Do 
they have an obligation to find alternative caregivers?  Yes; this 
does not constitute a positive obligation based on forestalling 
theory. Must they, by law, give notice that the child is in need of 
a caregiver? Yes. Must they bear any costs at all to keep the child 
from dying, supposing they do not want to raise it? The only 
costs they need bear are those necessary to bring the child to the 
proverbial church steps or make other similar arrangements.
VI. Conclusion
Rothbard’s theory of the natural rights of children, though 
radical in the contemporary American context, is normative 
in the context of more traditional cultures. The framework 
he laid out was an important step in articulating rights to one 
of the last minorities in the United States to obtain legal and 
political rights, minors. The crucial issue Rothbard raises is the 
weight to be given to a child’s preferences in the matter of strict/
mandatory vs. permissive/optional caregiving.
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